By Niko Block - February 14
The peace conference at Annapolis last November represented nothing unexpected or even unique in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Faced with unprecedented levels of unpopularity, the Bush administration made yet another vague attempt at peace in order to remind his disaffected constituents and the people of the Arab world that – regardless of what may or may not transpire – the President of the United States cares about the people of Palestine. There was an ecstatic nostalgia amongst the GOP party base, eager to harken back to that glorious moment in 1993, when, after months of exhaustive and though ambivalent negotiations in Norway, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat shook hands in the White House Rose Garden. The new spate of negotiations meant a three days in a quaint Maryland suburb, delicately couched by the North American press with all the affectionate, interpersonal analysis that international relations inevitably demand: whose hand touched whose shoulder, what Bush and Olmert were wearing as they ruminated about their families and hobbies over a couple of smouldering cigars. “This is the holy grail of diplomacy,” quipped one American official.
But despite the clamour and hoopla surrounding Annapolis, most journalists were wary enough of the precarious situations of all three leaders not to lend the negotiations much faith. Nearly five years since the advent of the paralytic Road Map, and well aware of the convoluted tit-for-tat dynamic that has developed between Olmert and Abbas, few were expecting much from a negotiating cohort that proved itself incapable of even issuing a joint statement that committed to more than “vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations.” “Ongoing” and “continuous” being perfect synonyms, it’s fairly obvious the team was struggling to boost the word count.
Even Washington’s efforts to garner support for the negotiations somehow rang of pretence. Desperate for a show of support from the Arab League – perhaps as part of its ongoing campaign to snub the Iranians – the Bush administration doled out invitations across the Middle East, hastily acquiescing to an abstentious Syria by agreeing to grant the Golan Heights a token spot on the agenda of official negotiations. The New York Times noted with relish Prince Saud al-Faisal’s refusal to shake hands with any Israeli officials, and leftist pundits of US foreign policy resurrected their perennial question as to why, if Israel is not complying with American demands, the administration does not withhold its lavish $3 billion in military aid.
Progress at the talks was chronically frustrated by the Israelis’ insistence that ongoing missile attacks by Hamas nullify Israel’s obligations under the Road Map. But while Israeli deaths at the hands of Palestinian militants reached a nine-year low in 2007,** Olmert continues to insist that Palestinian aggression during this time justifies his own non-compliance with Bush’s Road Map to Peace. In what has caused pervasive ire on the peace front, Olmert has repeatedly insisted that he will not curb the growth of settlements that he intends to retain in any final-status agreement, in effect overruling land negotiations before they even take place. Olmert’s childish behaviour on the settlement issue, coupled with the ongoing construction of the separation wall, serve merely to exacerbate the peace process, and undermine any future negotiations over the West Bank.
Annapolis may prove a footnote in the annals of the conflict, likely to be buried under the mountains of drama and front-page developments this conflict has yet to bear, and dwelt upon only by the die-hards and nanohistorians of future generations. But it is also the most recent in a series of pledges to reach a viable, just, and final-status peace. Both leaders stated they were committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state by the end of this year. The purpose of Annapolis Monitor is to hold them accountable, to keep tabs in particular on the Israeli government, because of the two sides it is the one whose dictates will determine the viability of the nascent Palestinian state, and who must make concessions towards that end.
